Macroeconomic policy and agricultural development : concepts and case studies of Egypt, Morocco and Jordan by Bredahl, Maury E.
Macroeconomic Policy and 
Agricultural Development: 
Concepts and Case Studies of Egypt, 
Morocco and Jordan 
College of Agriculture 
International Series 1 0 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
-- - - . 
Special SR 331 
June,1985 

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
CONCEPTS AND CASE STUDIES OF 
EGYPT, MOROCCO AND JORDAN 
by 
Maury E. Bredahl 
June 1985 
This study was funded in part by the Agency for International 
Development under the Agricultural Policy Analysis Project No. 
936-4084. Responsibility for its content and views are entirely 
those of the authors. 
PREFACE 
This report was prepared with the support of the AID 
Agricultural Policy Project in cooperation with the Near East 
Horticultural Export Marketing Study. The cooperation is based on 
the need to analyze agri cultura 1 trade and domestic po 1 i ci es of 
potentia 1 importers of horti cul tura 1 products. The intent is to 
determine the impact of these policies on growth of import demand. 
It is also based on the need to determine the impact of macroeconomic 
policies and macro prices -- exchange rates, interest rates and wage 
rates -- on the ability of the study countries -- Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco -- to compete in international markets. 
This report addresses the second topic -- that of the impact of 
macroeconomic policies and macro prices. A companion report entitled 
"The Common Agri cultura 1 Po 1 icy, Macroeconomic Forces and 
Horticultural Trade" addresses the impact of importer policies and 
import demand. 
Maury E. Bredahl, an associate professor of Agricultural 
Economics at the University of Missouri-Columbia, is a consultant to 
the Agricultural Policy Project. 
The input of Edward Hogan, Michael V. Martin and Ludwig 
Eisgruber is gratefully acknowledged. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The study of the impact of macroeconomic policies on the 
competitive advantage of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in international 
horticultural markets first develops a conceptual framework and then 
applies that framework to each of the study countries. 
Conceptual Framework. The influences of macroeconomic policies 
and macro prices -- interest rates, wage rates and foreign exchange 
rates -- are pervasive, touching all sectors of an economy. In the 
course of this study, it became apparent that exchange rate and price 
policies were the dominant factors in the international competitive 
position of the study countries. Therefore, while the full range of 
macroeconomic forces is considered, only the conceptual framework for 
evaluating exchange rate and price policies is discussed here. 
Until the debt crisis of the early 1980s, overva 1 ued exchange 
rates were the norm for most developing countries. These countries 
fixed nominal exchange rates in spite of rapid domestic price and 
wage i nfl a ti on, so the currency became overva 1 ued. Because export 
prices rose as wage and input costs increased, the fixed nomina 1 
exchange rate decreased the i nterna tiona 1 competitiveness of these 
nations. The increased prices cou 1 d have been neutra 1 i zed by a 
devaluation of the currency. 
Developing nations followed a fixed-nominal exchange rate and an 
appreciating real exchange rate policy for many reasons. For some, 
the dramatic increase in the prices and value of their raw material 
exports during the mid 1970s reduced the need to export agricultural 
and manufactured products. Rather, the prices of consumer goods, 
particularly foodstuffs, and capital goods imports were their primary 
concern. A fixed nomina 1 exchange rate minimized the cost of these 
imports. Since domestic inflation exceeded that of major trading 
partners, import prices, in the absence of countervailing tariffs and 
other import restrictions, rose at a lower rate; consequently, 
imports were substituted for domestic production. Current account 
deficits -- a signal to depreciate a currency -- were not a concern, 
as the recycled petro-dollars provided the means to finance the 
deficits through increased international borrowing. 
Since economic growth would be reduced as cheap imports 
displaced domestic production, these nations selectively limited 
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imports through tariff and nontariff barriers, thus fostering import 
substitution. In many cases, import-substitution industries were 
stimulated by allowing raw material imports but limiting finished 
product imports. In turn, these policies discouraged production of 
agricultural and manufactured exports. 
On the whole, these nations turned inward for economic growth 
with those policies financed by international borrowing. 
Competitiveness and international markets and exports of agricultural 
and manufactured goods were discouraged. The fixed nominal exchange 
rate forced domestic inflation to be fully reflected in export 
prices. The price of import-substitution goods was inflated by trade 
restrictions, while their imported input costs were reduced by the 
overvalued currency. 
The evolution of price policies and their linkage with exchange 
rates and other macroeconomic variables are major factors shaping the 
current economic environment. The prices of many basic consumer 
goods are fixed and heavily subsidized. These subsidies contributed 
significantly to government expenditures and fiscal deficits. But, 
as long as international and domestic credit were available to 
finance the deficit, the subsidies were not a major concern. The 
overvalued exchange rates tended to minimize government expenditures 
as import prices were held down. The overvalued currency coupled 
with the price policies discriminated against agricultural production 
for domestic as well as export markets. 
Economic Environment. All of the study countries face a similar 
set of internal and externa 1 constraints. Each faces 1 a rge fi seal 
and current account deficits. Each is dependent on external forces 
-- exports of raw materials, international credit or aid and worker 
remittances -- for economic growth. The degree of economic crisis 
varies across the study countries, but each faces significant 
economic challenges in the next several years. 
Each of the three countries has faced large fiscal and current 
account deficits since the late 1970s. These deficits have been 
financed by international lending, so the level of international debt 
has rapidly grown to the point that a 1 arge proportion of export 
earnings must be devoted to meeting debt service obligations. 
Indeed, Morocco has been unable to meet its international obligations 
and has been forced to reschedule its debt and debt service. A 
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primary concern of each of the three governments is the generation of 
sufficient foreign exchange to meet debt service requirements and to 
finance economic growth. 
The second aspect of the current economic environment is these 
nations' dependence on external forces for economic growth. Egypt is 
dependent on oil exports, tourism and Suez Canal receipts. For 
Jordan, economic stability depends on fi nanci a 1 transfers from OPEC 
and other countries. Morocco is dependent on the price and quantity 
of phosphate exported. Each of the three countries depends on worker 
remittances for a large portion of its foreign exchange earnings. 
The resu 1 t of the economic environment is a recognition by the 
governments of the need to reduce their nation's dependence on 
external sources of growth. Each must turn from an inward oriented 
-- import substitution -- to an externally oriented -- export 
promotion -- policy. These policies are the focus of the next 
section. 
Economic Policies. In general, each of the three countries has 
adopted export promotion policies. But the implications of these 
policies for international competitiveness in horticultural trade 
vary greatly across the countries. 
The macroeconomic policies of Jordan promote its two major 
exports -- skilled people and services. The policies attempt to 
maximize national income from its greatest national asset, a highly 
skilled and educated labor force. An extension of the exploitation 
of that asset is the export of services by pro vi ding fi nanc i a 1 and 
other services to the Mideast. 
In order to maximize worker remittances and the inflow of 
capital to its banking system, the Jordanian currency has been pegged 
to the SDR (Special Drawing Rights). A stable and predictable 
exchange rate promotes skilled 1 abor and service exports. As a 
consequence of its 1 i nkage to the SDR and the appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar, the currency has recently appreciated with respect to 
those of most potential trade partners. The appreciation encourages 
labor exports, but it discourages agricultural and manufactured 
exports. The unique situation of Jordan precludes an exchange rate 
policy that would stimulate agricultural exports. 
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Morocco, on the other hand, has adopted a broad sweeping set of 
policy initiatives to promote agricultural and manufactured exports. 
An important component of the export promotion program is periodic 
devaluation of the currency. It is unclear if the currency is 
undervalued at this time, but it has depreciated against the 
currencies of major trading partners and competing exporters. In 
order to mitigate the negative impact of the depreciating currency on 
worker remittances, special interest-bearing bank accounts have been 
established. In addition to the exchange rate policy, tax holidays, 
guaranteed repatriation of profits and other changes in investment 
laws are intended to promote investment. The program adopted by the 
Moroccan government is, by far, the most aggressive in the study 
countries. 
Egypt, like Morocco, has adopted an impressive array of export 
promotion policies. But the obstacles to overcome are much greater. 
Exemplary of these obstacles are exchange rate and pricing policies. 
Egypt maintains several "official" exchange rates. Government 
foreign exchange earnings from most agricultural and petroleum 
exports and Suez Canal receipts are converted at a clearly overvalued 
exchange rate. This overvalued exchange rate 1 imits the government 
deficit, as imported food can be resold at a much lower price than if 
an appropriately valued exchange rate were used. 
The private sector obtains foreign exchange from a pool funded 
by tourism and worker remittances. The "free market" exchange rate 
reflects the demand of the private and public sector and the supply 
from worker remittances and tourism. The recent large current 
account deficit prompted restriction of imports which reduced the 
demand for foreign exchange. At the same time, increased worker 
remittances caused the free market exchange rate to appreciate, 
further aggravating the current account deficit. The exchange rate 
has not reflected internal price inflation and other forces that tend 
to reduce current account deficits. In contrast to Morocco and 
Jordan, whose exchange rate po 1 i ci es promote exports of services or 
people, those of Egypt serve no clear purpose in promoting exports. 
Of course, within the present framework, the Egyptian government 
could declare and enforce an exchange rate policy beneficial to 
horticultural exports. 
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Agricultural price policies of Egypt have tended to discriminate 
against agricultural production and exports in favor of domestic 
consumption. Although recent steps have been taken to reduce the 
distortions of price policies, those policies will continue to skew 
agricultural production. The impact on horticultural products may 
well be benefi cial, as most are not subject to price controls. But 
most are subject to a myriad of export regu 1 at ions and some are 
subject to export taxes. 
Conclusions. Clearly, the current policies of Morocco and 
Jordan are more carefully formulated and potentially more effective 
in promoting exports than are those of Egypt. That conclusion is not 
to deny the significant changes in Egyptian policies to promote 
exports but rather to recognize that those changes fall short of 
those of the other countries. Po 1 i c i es must be evaluated on the 
basis of the policies in other countries, not on the basis of past 
policies within a country. The policies of Morocco should promote 
agricultural and horticultural exports. Those of Jordan should 
promote exports of skilled people and service which may not promote 
agricultural and horticultural exports. 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Opportunity costs determine the 1 eve 1 and the mix of economic 
activities. The opportunity cost of a consumption activity is the 
next-best activity foregone; of consumption, it is the price of the 
next-best good that could have been purchased. The opportunity cost 
of a production activity is the next-best activity; of producing a 
good, it is the price of the next-best good that cou 1 d have been 
produced. If governments do not intervene in markets, opportunity 
costs tend to equalize as resources flow to their "highest and best 
use." 
But the highest and best economic use may not be best for the 
overall welfare of the nation. So governments often affect 
opportunity costs directly by, for example, setting maximum consumer 
prices for basic goods. This type of direct intervention in 
agricultural and food markets falls into the general category of food 
price po 1 icy. In effect, the government influences the opportunity 
cost of producing and consuming goods in order to influence the mix 
and level of production and consumption activities. And in the 
process, it influences the distribution of income as well. Often 
food price po 1 i ci es have unintended effects. Setting a food price 
too 1 ow may reduce profits and 1 ower production. The production 
decline may increase imports because demand increases. The 
production impact is less if a subsidy is used to reduce the 
consumption price. 
Governments, of course, change opportunity cost in many other 
ways. Investments in infrastructure, education and information 
reduce the opportunity costs of agricultural production. Similarly, 
the opportunity costs of consumption may be changed. Increasingly, 
economists have come to recognize that the adoption of a production 
(or consumption) technology requires a change in opportunity costs. 
A complementary change in food price policy is needed to facilitate 
economic development. 
The interactions of food price policy with food consumption and 
production are usually self-evident. But the interactions of 
macroeconomic policies -- fiscal, monetary and budget -- with the 
food system are more varied and complex. These policies coupled with 
those for the macro prices -- exchange, interest and wage rates --
may fundamentally change opportunity costs and thus the mix of food 
production and consumption. The interactions of these policies, 
depending on their nature, may significantly alter the intended 
impact of food price policy and development investments. Evaluating 
the change in opportunity costs due to these policies is a 
fundamental but often neglected part of designing a development 
strategy. 
Finally, the government's opportunity costs determine the type 
and nature of policies adopted. In recent years, the opportunity 
costs of isolation and restricted trade have increased significantly. 
The imperative need for foreign exchange to meet debt service 
payments has fundamentally altered opportunity cost and hence 
government po 1 i ci es. Much more so now than in the past, externa 1 
constraints are influencing policies that determine opportunity 
costs. Consequently, the opportunity cost of food production, 
consumption and trade have been dramatically altered. 
Elements of Macroeconomic Policy 
The first step in unraveling the complex interactions of 
policies is to identify the elements of macroeconomic and macro price 
po 1 i ci es. Fi sea 1 po 1 icy is the wi 11 i ngness and ability to generate 
government revenues and the willingness to spend. The measure of the 
complementarity or conflict of these activities is the budget 
(fiscal) surplus or deficit. An additional consideration is the 
dependence of developing nations on external sources for revenues. 
The revenues from sales of a non-renewable resource (e.g., oil), 
tourism, worker remittances, and external credit vary significantly 
across years and cannot be controlled or even influenced by 
government policies. An unanticipated decline in external revenues 
may significantly increase the budget deficit. Together, fiscal 
policies and the deficit are the first elements of macroeconomic 
policy. 
The method used to finance the fi sea 1 deficit is the second 
e 1 ement. If the government is unab 1 e to finance the deficit by 
internal or external borrowing, it must create money to do so. The 
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extent to which the deficit is f i nanced by creating money influences 
the rate of price inf l ation. Inflation will alter the opportunity 
cost of food production and consumption. The nature of the impact 
depends, in turn, on macro price pol icy which is discussed in the 
next section. 
The third element of macroeconomic policy is the allocation of 
expenditures or budget policy. In general, allocations to the food 
sector may be divided into food production and consumption categories 
and, within each of those categories , i nto current consumption and 
investment activities. On the production side, current consumption 
or recurrent expenditures inc l ude input and output subsidies and the 
provision of essential government services. On the consumption side, 
recurrent expenditures are primarily consumer subsidies. On both 
sides, investment is broadly defined as any activity that increases 
the efficiency of converting food to human productivity, such as 
health care and sanitation . 
Monetary, fiscal and budget policies generate pervasive, 
economy-wide effects in two fashions depending on macro price policy. 
First, the level and variability of macro prices are influenced if 
they are determined by market forces. Second , if macro prices are 
administratively or legislatively determined, non-market solutions 
must be found for the distortions that often result. For example, a 
fixed exchange rate may necessitate regulations to control capital 
flows and to allocate foreign exchange earnings. 
Events of the 1970s and early 1980s illustrate these pol icy 
interactions. Almost globally, developing nations and newly 
industrializing nations adopted expansionary economic policies in the 
mid 1970s. In some cases the enabling factor was the commodity price 
boom of the early 1970s that greatly increased the level of realized 
and anticipated government revenues. In other cases it was the ready 
availability of international credit -- in part due to the recycling 
of petrodollars. The ability to finance fiscal deficits externally 
changed the opportunity cost of government policy because it allowed 
budget deficits while generating minimal rates of inflation. The 
funding from external sources allowed the allocation of capital to 
projects with long-term, delayed payoffs. The fiscal deficit (a 
product of monetary and fiscal policy) and budget policy contributed 
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significantly to the current economic difficulties of developing 
nations. 
The opportunity cost of food price policy changed as well. 
External borrowing, increased export revenues, and worker remittances 
financed growing consumer subsidies and food imports. Subsidies grew 
because inflation, although moderate in many countries, increased as 
economic growth accelerated and money creation financed a portion of 
the fiscal deficit. Over time, the subsidies became a large 
component of the deficit and a driving force of government 
expenditures. Agricultural production was discouraged because 
producer prices increased less than the rate of inflation. 
The policies of many nations led to overvaluated exchange rates. 
Their inflation rates exceeded those of their trading partners. The 
differential could have been offset by a devaluation of the 
developing countries' currency, but many held the exchange rate 
fixed. The overvalued exchange rate kept food import prices and thus 
domestic prices low, encouraging consumption and discouraging 
production. Moreover, 
export production. A 
the overvalued exchange rate discouraged 
depreciation of the currency would have 
increased export prices and allowed producers to maintain profits in 
spite of increasing domestic input costs. The fixed exchange rate 
policy coupled with trade restrictions on industrial and non-food 
consumer goods tended to increase production of import substitutes at 
the expense of export goods. 
As international capital markets closed and commodity prices 
declined in the early 1980s, these countries created money to finance 
the budget deficit, which in turn increased inflation. The rising 
level of prices forced increased consumer subsidies, which increased 
budget deficits. At the same time, as their inflation rates 
continued to exceed those of their major trading partners, their 
exchange rates became further overvalued. And so their 
competitiveness in export markets declined, which further increased 
the budget and current account deficits. 
The opportunity cost of government pol icy has changed. 
Generating foreign exchange to meet debt and debt service payments 
and to finance economic growth is imperative. Such policies as more 
rea 1 i sti c exchange rates and reduced consumer subsidies have been 
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adopted to reflect these opportunity costs. Agricultural production 
has become favored because it is seen as both an import substitute 
and export good. 
Macro Prices and the Food Sector 
The interaction of macroeconomic and macro price policies 
outlined above is discussed and analyzed in more detail in this 
section in order to extend the conceptual framework to the 
interaction of macro prices with the food sector . The impact of 
these prices on opportunity costs influences the outcome of 
development projects and food price policies. 
Currency Exchange Rates 
When accompanied by other supporting trade and capita 1 flow 
policies, the exchange rate may be controlled by a government. Fixed 
exchange policies of developing nations have resulted in an 
overvalued currency which tends to discriminate against the 
agricultural and exporting sectors. 
A leather coat might cost 2000 pesos (M$) to produce in Mexico 
and $80 to produce in the United States. If M$25 exchanges for $1, a 
coat produced in Mexico would cost $80 in the United States, while 
U.S. coats would cost M$2000 in Mexico. Under these conditions, no 
trade would occur. If, however, the Mexican government fixes the 
exchange rate at M$20 to the dollar, the cost of a U.S. produced coat 
would fall to M$1600 and Mexicans would prefer to import coats rather 
than purchase the M$2000 domestic product. The overvaluation also 
prices Mexican coats out of the U.S. market; they would cost $100 to 
import. 
The change in the exchange rate alters opportunity costs and 
affects production and consumption. First, imports are undervalued 
in Mexico. Imported goods in Mexico are priced below domestic 
opportunity costs, so production fa 11 s and imports increase. The 
overvalued exchange rate places an implicit tax on production and 
provides an implicit subsidy for consumption. It also discriminates 
against production for the export market. Because products are 
overpriced in foreign markets and underpriced in domestic markets, 
imports increase and exports decline. An indirect effect is that 
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production for domestic consumption of nonti·aded goods tends to be 
greater, as export production tends to be less. 
While this example illustrates the impact of an increase in the 
international purchasing power of a currency , a more general 
eva 1 uati on of a currency ' s va 1 ue uses the 1 eve 1 of prices in one 
country in comparison to a second. If the movements in an exchange 
rate simply offset relative rates of inflation, then purchasing power 
parity is said to be maintained. In this case, an exchange rate 
movement does not by itself induce trade flows. 
Quite clearly a number of developing nations have recently 
embraced policies to determine more real i stically the value of their 
currency. The obvious impacts are an increase in import prices and a 
decline in export prices. But other, more subtle impacts must be 
considered. 
First, the method of app lying selective devaluations tends to 
contribute to domestic inflation. At the extreme , such as the case 
of Me xi co, the exchange rate is deva 1 ued daily. Thus, prices of 
imported goods increase daily. Other countries, Morocco for example, 
have devalued on a semi-annual or quarterly basis. The resulting 
domestic inflation due to the increase in the price of imports varies 
only by degree across these countries. This inflation operates 
against fixed consumer prices to increase subsidies and so government 
expenditures. Financing the subsidies by money creation increases 
inflation still further. Consequently, many of these countries may 
well experience higher inflation than ever before. 
Second, almost all of these countries' foreign debt is 
denominated in U.S. dollars. The quantities of goods priced in the 
domestic currency that must be exported to meet debt service 
requirements and to finance imports must increase as a currency 
declines in value. The exception to this generalization occurs when 
a nation's exports are priced in dollars in the international market, 
as is the case for petroleum, phosphates and many other products. 
There, international purchasing power rests with the relative 
strength of the dollar. One of the factors motivating OPEC members' 
willingness to reduce the price of oil is the increased international 
purchasing power of dollar-denominated oil exports. 
Quite clearly, the policy norm of the future may well include 
the use of the exchange rate to promote exports. This is a sharp 
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contrast to the fixed exchange rate policies of the past that led to 
import-promoting, overvalued exchange rates. 
Interest Rates and Capital Markets 
Interest rates serve two functions. First, interest rates 
allocate capital among alternative uses with varying rates of return. 
This might be thought of as the demand for capital. Second, interest 
rates determine the supply of capital in the form of domestic savings 
or imported capital. The interest rate must be sufficient to induce 
income earners to shift income from present consumption to savings. 
Thus, the interest rate must exceed the inflation rate by a margin 
sufficient to induce savings. 
Economic deve 1 opment depends on capita 1 creation, hence a 1 ow 
real interest rate has been an integral part of the development 
policy of many nations. Evaluation of the impact of this policy 
requires a rudimentary knowledge of the interaction of interest rate 
policy with monetary and fiscal policy, the savings rate and the 
development of financial institutions. 
A "low" interest rate policy has two dimensions. First, if the 
interest rate is lower than the rate of inflation, the flow of 
domestic savings may be less than that needed to finance economic 
growth. Second, if savings plus international capital flows are 
insufficient to meet the demand for capital, institutions must be 
developed to ration available capital. 
Institutional rationing of capital leads to market segmentation. 
The government-sanctioned lending institutions tend to serve the 
commercial agricultural and industrial interests. Rural credit 
markets tend to be informal and the interest rate higher. And these 
differential interest rates arising from segmentation of capital 
markets lead to differing rates of capitalization across sectors of 
the economy. Capital flows to the industrial and commercial 
agricultural segment; the residual flows to other segments of the 
agricultural economy. 
In addition to domestic interest rates, the rate paid on 
extern a 1 debt has become a cri ti ca 1 factor shaping macroeconomic 
policies. Recent increases in interest rates to levels far above 
hi stori ca 1 norms, coup 1 ed with the 1 arge debt payment due to the 
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short-run nature of most obligations, have placed an external 
constraint on many developing nations' internal growth. External 
interest rates have changed the opportunity costs of government 
policies. In particular, nations must generate increased export 
earnings in order to import the capital needed for economic 
development while still meeting debt service. 
Wage Rates 
The legislation of minimum rural and urban wages is common in 
developing nations. At an abstract level, the minimum wages 
influence the choice of production technology, rural-urban migration, 
and export competitiveness. Whi 1 e a consensus on the impact of 
minimum wage has not been reached, some tendencies can be described. 
First, a minimum urban wage, which can be readily enforced only 
for government jobs and highly visible industries, tends to lead to 
the establishment of an urban "elite" who have obtained those jobs. 
Workers competing for jobs in more informal sectors tend to receive 
much lower wages. Nevertheless, the establishment of a minimum urban 
wage changes the opportunity cost of rural employment and induces a 
flow of rural workers to urban areas. 
The establishment of a minimum wage changes the opportunity cost 
of capital and often leads to the adoption of labor-saving capital. 
The degree of substitution of capital for labor arising from the 
adoption of a minimum wage varies greatly across sectors and nations. 
Finally, increases in an effective minimum wage, as is the case for 
input prices in general, may lead to a decline in international 
competitiveness if not offset by a devaluation of the nation's 
currency. 
Summary 
Inappropriate macroeconomic, macro price and food prices, 
individually or in concert, often frustrate efforts to diffuse food 
production and consumption technology. The limiting effect of these 
macroeconomic and macro price policies on diffusion of technology can 
be reduced by the selection of an appropriate price policy. Or the 
effect can be reduced by the choice of techno 1 ogy and the scope of 
8 
development projects. The appropriate analytical framework is that 
of opportunity cost of production and consumption. 
The choice of macroeconomic and macro price policies is 
determined by domestic po 1 it i ca 1 forces and externa 1 constraints. 
The increased debt burden and debt service requirements of developing 
nations have placed an uncompromising external constraint on policy 
choice. In effect, the opportunity costs of government policies have 
been altered. The new opportunity costs wi 11 1 ead many nations to 
adopt policies favoring agricultural production as an import 
substitute or export good. But design of development programs must 
still consider these policies. 
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EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND POLICIES 
Economic Environment 
After several years of relative stagnation in economic growth, 
when real per capita gross domestic product (GOP) grew at less than 
one percent per year during 1970-74 (Figure 1), the Egyptian 
government initiated a major change in economic policy in 1973. The 
economic stntegy -- termed t he open-door po 1 icy -- sought to turn 
the economy toward export markets and import substitution through 
creation of a free foreign exchange market and es tab 1 i shment of 
economic incentives for foreig n and domestic private investment. 
Subsequently, the economy expanded more rapidly. with real per 
capita GOP increasing at 5.9 percent during 1975-79 and over 6 
percent in the early 1980s (F i gure 1). The impressive economic 
growth, however, did not result from the economic strategy adopted in 
the early 1970s. Rather, the growth of the late 1970s was fueled in 
part by dramatically increased government expenditures and resulting 
budget deficits (Figure 2). Government revenues increased from about 
E£1.2 billion in 1974 to E£3.7 billion in 1979, but expenditures 
increased from about E£2 billion to 6.6 billion in the latter year. 
Thus, the budget deficit increased from less than E£1 billion in 1974 
to almost 3.0 billion in 1979 . The budget deficits were primarily 
financed by external borrowing; external debt (medium- and long-term) 
increased from US$2. 4 billion in 1973 to US$12. 2 billion in 1979 
(Figure 3). 
At the same time that the fi sea 1 deficit was financed 
externally, a rapidly growing merchandise trade deficit required 
large external capital inflows as well. Merchandise exports grew at 
a very slow rate from 1970 to 1978 with a bill ion US$ jump in 1979 
due to the increase in petroleum prices (Figure 5). During that 
period, merchandise imports doubled, with the result that the 
resource gap (trade ba l ance) increased from around one billion US$ in 
the early 1970s to US$3.6 billion in 1979. The resource gap was 
partially offset by increased remittances from Egyptians working in 
North African and Gulf countries (Figure 6). Private unrequited 
transfers, the bulk of which are worker remittances, increased from 
less than US$100 million in the early 1970s to 2.3 billion in 1979. 
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The increasing 1 eve 1 of worker remittances and petro 1 eum revenues, 
coupled with the reopening of the Suez Canal held the current account 
deficit to an average of about US$1.2 billion during this period 
(Figure 7). 
These sources of economic growth continued to fuel the economy 
in the early 1980s. The government deficit increased to an estimated 
E£5.5 billion in 1983/84 as government expenditures grew to almost 
E£16.0 billion. The level of merchandise imports continued to grow 
from 1980 to 1981/82 while merchandise exports and worker remittances 
stagnated. As a result, the current account deficit ballooned to 
US$2.4 billion in 1981/82. To finance the fiscal and current account 
deficits, external debt was increased to over US$15.2 billion in 
1981, US$16.6 billion in 1982 and almost US$18 billion in 1983. The 
startling current account deficit in 1981/82 prompted the government 
to restrict imports, primarily of the public sector, in the following 
years. The import restrictions, coupled with a further expansion of 
worker remittances, have reduced the current account deficit to an 
estimated US$871 million in 1983/84. The cumulative effect of fiscal 
and trade policies since 1973 is an external debt of almost US$18 
billion and annual debt service requirement exceeding US$2.5 billion. 
The external sources of economic growth allowed the government 
largely to ignore the basic philosophy of the economic strategy 
adopted in the early 1970s. Rather, government involvement in 
production of many consumer goods was maintained at high levels. The 
public sector produces consumer goods ranging from pencils to soft 
drinks to shoes under centralized price controls (administered 
prices) (Table 1). In the early 1980s these public sector 
enterprises accounted for more than 30 percent of industrial 
production. The wide-ranging participation of the public sector is 
indicated by the following aggregate data: government expenditures 
represented about 60 percent of GDP, 40 percent of employment and 70 
percent of investment. 
The public sector involvement in industrial production has had 
several effects. First, in order to keep the administered prices of 
consumer products low, administered input prices were kept low. For 
the agri cu ltura 1 sector, producer prices of many products have been 
held well below private (world market) prices. Second, it has 
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TABLE 1 Industrial Commodities Produced Under Centralized Price 
Control, Egypt, 1984 
Commodities Produced by Industries Supervised by Ministry of Industry 
Soap 
Industrial detergents 
Cigarettes 
Processed tobacco 
Cigarette paper 
Cheese 
Margarine 
Edible oil 
Sugar 
Macaroni 
Milk and yogurt 
Soft drinks 
Low-priced fabrics 
Low-priced sweaters 
Low-priced blankets 
Cotton yarn 
Woolen yarn 
Plywood 
Drinking glasses 
Salt 
Shoes 
Source: Ministry of Industry 
Reinforcing iron bars 
Fertilizers 
Tanned leather 
Refrigerators 
Washing machines 
Passenger cars 
Acetylene gas 
Pencils 
Note: In 1980/81, 27.4 of industry production fell in this 
category. For 1981/82 and 1982/83, the estimated 
percentages are 30.5 and 30.7 respectively. 
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created a dualistic economic structure with a lethargic public sector 
on the one hand and a dynamic import sector on the other. 
The economic policies pursued during the 1970s and 1980s placed 
a number of implicit and explicit obstacles to export promotion and 
import subs ti tuti on, not the 1 east of which were an unrea 1 i sti c 
exchange rate policy, foreign exchange confiscation, and restrictive 
and discriminatory import and export regulations. 
It is generally recognized and accepted in Egypt that the 
dependence on externa 1 sources for economic growth must be changed 
and that the sources of economic growth must be broadened by a 
virtual transformation of public and private sectors toward export 
promotion and import substitution. That recognition is reflected in 
changes in the current policy environment. 
Economic Policies 
Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange Policy 
The Egyptian foreign exchange and trade system remains very 
complex despite liberalization in the mid-1970s. The foreign 
exchange market is fragmented into three poo 1 s and an even 1 arger 
number of exchange rates. 
Official rates, used by the Central Bank, are based on a foreign 
exchange poo 1 derived from Suez Canal revenues and the export of 
cotton, rice, and petroleum. One official rate is used primarily for 
the payment of external government debt and the importation of basic 
supply commodities and selected agricultural inputs. This official 
rate, unchanged since 1979, is $1.43/E£ (.7 E£/$). In addition, 
special exchange rates apply to transactions with central plan 
economies with non-convertible currencies (the Soviet Union, People's 
Republic of China, and North Korea). 
Commercial bank rates are used by commercial banks for the 
commercial bank pool. The commercial bank pool is funded by worker 
remittances and tourism. In August 1981, an official commercial bank 
rate of $1.20/E£ was established. Although the official rate has 
remained unchanged, few transactions are conducted at the rate. The 
bulk of transactions occur at a premium rate, which in mid-1984 
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equalled $.89/E£ (E£1.12/$). Currently, only selected tourism 
transactions occur at the official commercial bank rate. 
Until April 1983, the majority of private exports were channeled 
through the commercial banks at the official rate. Since then, 
exporters have been allowed to retain foreign exchange earnings and 
to change at the free market rate. 
"Free" or "own" exchange market, established in 1976, is funded 
by workers 1 remittances that don 1 t go through the commercia 1 banks, 
foreign investment, and tourism. The private sector uses this market 
to finance imports and for foreign dollar denominated assets. 
Analysis. The overvaluation of the official (Central Bank) rate 
relative to the free market rate underprices certain agricultural 
exports and foodstuff imports. If the export (world market) price is 
$1 per unit, the export price in l oca 1 currency at the offici a 1 rate 
would be only E£.7 in comparison to that of E£1.20 at free market 
rate. In turn, the resale price of selected foodstuffs (wheat, for 
example) would be E£.7 at the official rate versus E£1.20 at the free 
market rate. This example illustrates that overvaluation of the 
Central Bank rate is an important element of the subsidization of 
basic consumption products. 
The determination of the free market and of the commercial bank 
rates is based on the supp 1 y from worker remittances, tourism and 
exports not covered by the Central Bank rate, and the demand to 
finance imports of the pub 1 i c and private sector. Hence, the free 
market rate will not fully reflect the current account balance except 
as the government is able to control imports. It will also not fully 
reflect differential rates of inflation. 
From April 1982 to March 1984, the real commercial bank and free 
market rate are estimated to have appreciated by almost 27 percent. 
The appreciation of the exchange rate is attributed to the increase 
in workers 1 remittances, the restraint of imports and the growing 
overvaluation of the Central Bank rate which held down input price 
increases to the agricultural and public industrial sectors. The 
appreciation of the currency aggravated an already large trade and 
current account deficit. 
Quite clearly, the recent reforms in the exchange rate and 
retention of foreign exchange earnings represent a favorable change 
for exporters. However, just as clearly, the dependence on worker 
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remittances to fund the commercial bank and free market pools adds an 
element of instability to exchange rate determination and isolates, 
at least to some extent, the exchange rate from adjustment due to 
internal inflation. The government can affect the free market rate 
and premium commercial bank rate only indirectly. 
Wage Policy 
Purchasing power of consumers is maintained by administered 
prices for basic consumer goods rather than maintenance of a minimum 
wage. As a consequence, the wage rate for the agricultural and 
industrial sector reflects the supply of labor relative to demand. 
The outflow of workers to other countries, estimated at about 
4.5 million in the 1980s, has significantly increased the average 
wage level. From 1970 to 1979, wages are estimated to have increased 
fourfold. From 1979 to 1983, the average daily wage almost tripled 
(Table 2). This increase in average wages operated against a 
constant Centra 1 Bank exchange rate and, unti 1 recently, against 
appreciating commercial bank and free market rate. Export prices, 
other things constant, have not offset the significant increase in 
labor costs. 
Export Promotion Policies 
The A.I.D. Mission in Egypt has identified several recent policy 
changes that will increase the competitive position of private sector 
agricultural exporters. The changes include 
1. Ministry of Economy Decree No. 126/1983 (April 22, 1983), 
permitting private sector exporters to retain foreign 
exchange earnings for most types of commodity exports 
(including most horticultural products) and to receive the 
free market rate of exchange for their hard currency when 
buying Egyptian pounds. 
2. Law #95 of August 4, 1983, establishing the Export 
Development Bank. 
3. A premium on exports under bilateral trade agreements 
compensating for deterioration of the exchange rate. 
4. Abolition of export committees that fixed minimum prices 
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TABLE 2 Daily Agricultural Wage and the Exchange Rate, Egypt, 
1979-1983 
Daily Wage.!/ 
Free 
Year Exchange Rate 
(Ef) ($/Ef) 
1979 1.56 1.08 
1980 1.95 1.12 
1981 2.56 1.28 
1982 3.25 1. 29 
1983 4.09 1.36 
Sources: Unpublished Ministry of Agricultural data and International 
Financial Statistics. 
ll Average daily wage plus prerequisites . 
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for fresh produce exports by the private sector; 
recommended (rather than obligatory) minimum export prices 
are announced. 
5. Establishment of five governmental committees involving the 
concerned governmental agencies and private sector 
exporters; the committees are to make recommendations about 
(a) transportation and cargo handling, (b) simplification 
of customs and other formalities, (c) relaxation of export 
quotas and prohibitions, (d) export planning, (e) moral and 
financial incentives to export. 
6. End of restrictions on the export of most fruits and some 
vegetables during offseason periods; in the past, the 
government sometimes had tried to contra 1 who 1 esa 1 e and 
retail prices by banning exports when supply was short. 
The mission concludes that the steps taken by the government of 
Egypt in 1983 to promote exports were selective in nature. Private 
sector agricultural, and specifically horticultural, exporters may 
benefit from the new po 1 icy environment for exports. In addition, 
the mission notes that the Minister of Economy also has been 
consulting with the private agricultural exporters as a legitimate 
interest group to solve selective problems (e.g., by allowing 
Jordanian-operated refrigerator trucks to undertake deliveries by 
land from Egypt to the Arabian Gulf states). The Ministry's Egyptian 
Export Promotion Centre has undertaken surveys of foreign markets for 
horticultural products and provides marketing assistance to Egyptian 
private sector exporters of such products. 
Price Policies 
Resource allocation in the agricultural and industrial sectors 
has been skewed by administered prices for public and private sector 
output. The goals of price policy have varied across commodities. 
For agricultural export crops (cotton and rice, for example), 
administered producer prices have typically fallen well below world 
market (export) prices. One objective, of course, was to maintain an 
important source of government revenues. In addition, maintaining 
1 ow producer prices kept down costs for pub 1 i c sector industries 
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(cotton production for the textile industry, for example). The 
objective in the latter case was providing low-priced consumer goods. 
The producer prices of important import-substitution crops have 
been held below world market (import) prices to minimize government 
expenditures to subsidize consumption. At least partially due to 
these price policies, the agricultural sector trade balance turned 
from a $300 million surplus in 1970 to a $2.5 billion deficit in 
1981. This dramatic growth in food imports has placed considerable 
strain on the balance of payments. At the same time, subsidies have 
grown to an estimated E£2 billion in 1983/84, about 13 percent of 
government expenditures. 
First, we turn briefly to comparison of domestic and 
international prices and then to some examples of the subsidy policy. 
In 1980, Ingram estimated that the domestic price of cotton was only 
18 percent of the international or export price (Table 3). He also 
estimated that wheat producer price was 54 percent of import price 
and rice was only 23 percent of export price. Later estimates 
(1982/83), reflect recent efforts to bring producer prices more in 
line with world market prices. Thus, resources would have flowed to 
those products that received most favorable price treatment or that 
were not covered by administered prices (fruit and vegetab 1 es, for 
example). 
The range of the deviation of producer, consumer, and import 
prices is illustrated for wheat, wheat flour and sugar (Table 4). 
The import and domestic prices for wheat have tended to converge, 
reflecting increases in the producer price and declines in the world 
price. In 1982/83, according to these estimates, the producer price 
was 82 percent of import price. The domestic se 11 i ng price was 32 
percent of import price and 40 percent of domestic producer price. 
Ma i nta i ni ng the domestic se 11 i ng price required a subsidy of 67 
percent on imports and of 60 percent on domestic production. 
The analysis is similar for wheat flour. The subsidy was more 
than double the domestic selling price in 1980/81 and about equal to 
it in 1982/83. The combination of a low producer price and a low 
consumer price contributes to increased levels of imports, as demand 
is greater and supply less than if world market prices prevailed. 
The intervention via administered prices has caused private 
returns to deviate from economic returns (shadow prices) for many 
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TABLE 3 Comparison of Domestic Producer and International Prices 
for Selected Agricultural Commodities, Egypt 
1980 1982/83 
Commodity Domestic Internationa1 Domestic Internationa1 
Cotton (ginned) 330 . 0 1800.0 1130.4 3270.1 
Wheat 77.0 141.0 104.2 127.7 
Rice 75.0 320.0 105.0 319.3 
Sugar Cane 18.2 26.7 
Source: 1980: Ingram, James C. "Egyptian Agricultural Price 
Policies and the Balance of Payments." 
1982/83: Ministry of Agriculture. 
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TABLE 4 Import, Producer and Domestic Selling Price for 
Selected Food Products, Egypt, 1979-1982/83 
Commodity 1979 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 
----------------(Ef/m.t.)----------------
WHEAT 
Prices 
Import Pri eel/ 124.6 141.1 
Producer Price 70.0 83.3 
Sell i ng Price 24.7 41.3 
Subsid.l': 
Imports 100.2 99.8 
Domestic Production 45.3 42.0 
WHEAT FLOUR 
Prices 
Import Price 174.9 241.82/ Selling Price 67 .8 70.7-
Ration 100.0 100.0 
Other 245.0 300.0 
Subsid.l': 
Ration 86.0 416.0 
Source: General Authority for Supply Commodities. 
1/ Average price for contracted imports. £1 For European-style bakeries. 
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144.5 127.7 
83.3 104.2 
41.3 41.3 
103.2 86.4 
42.0 61.9 
199.02/ 
70.7-
136.12/ 
70.7-
100.0 100.0 
300.0 300.0 
173.6 66.6 
products (Table 5). Moreover, the degree of distortion appears 
random. The ratio of private returns to economic returns varied from 
1. 27 for wheat to 15.53 for onions. In the former case, producer 
prices are administered with production sold to the government. In 
the latter case, the government is the sole exporter of onions and 
sets the export price. The table also illustrates that even though 
the private returns for fruits and vegetables fall short of economic 
returns, those returns are much greater than for cereals and cotton. 
The prices of fruit and vegetables have not been administered at 
the farm level. But maximum wholesale and retail prices have been 
established on a daily basis for vegetables and until 1984 for 
fruits. The establishment of a single price and not a range of 
prices reflecting quality differentials removes much of the incentive 
to supply high quality produce. To be sure, markets reward producers 
of qua 1 i ty produce to some degree, but the pricing system does not 
systematically provide an incentive. 
To summarize, the administered prices at the retail and consumer 
level have decreased the rate of economic growth. First, foreign 
exchange has been used for foodstuff imports at the expense of 
capital imports. Second, food consumption subsidies divert 
government revenues from capital to recurrent expenditures. 
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TABLE 5 Private (Financial) and Economic Returns to Land for Selected Agricultural Commodities. Egypt, 1981 
Ration Crop Private Economic Ratio 
Wheat 84 105 1.27 
Barley 43 56 1.30 
Onions 97 1506 15.53 
Rice 59 170 2.88 
Cotton 155 421 2.72 
Tomatoes 388 1193 3.07 
Potatoes 203 319 1.58 
Oranges 295 668 2.27 
Sugar Cane 155 212 1.37 
Source: World Bank Report No. 4136 EGT. 
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MOROCCAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND POLICIES 
Economic Environment 
From independence until the early 1970s, the Moroccan economy 
expanded at a steady, but unspectacular rate, reflecting a low level 
of domestic savings and, in the absence of extensive foreign 
investment and credit, a low level of domestic investment. Acting 
against gains in aggregate output, the high rate of population growth 
diluted per capita real gross domestic product, maintaining it at an 
almost constant level from 1967 through 1973 (Figure 8). At the same 
time, the economy was judged to be economically sound. Merchandise 
exports nearly equaled imports (Figure 12), and so the current 
account deficit was very sma 11 and easily financed through 1 imi ted 
foreign borrowing and aid (Figure 10). 
Because of the low growth potential from internal sources, the 
1973-77 economic development plan emphasized an export-oriented 
investment strategy to increase foreign exchange earnings and an 
income redistribution program along with other policies to increase 
domestic savings and thus provide the resources to increase 
investment. The key elements of the plan were almost immediately 
discarded as government receipts from phosphate exports increased 
from $200 million in 1973 to $900 million in 1974 and close to $850 
million in 1975. In anticipation of continuation of these revenues, 
the Moroccan government embarked 
investment program. Paralleling 
on an ambitious public-sector 
the actions of many nations 
following an increase in government revenues from extractive-resource 
exports, the economy and government policies turned inward. 
The rapid expansion of public sector investment increased its 
proportion of gross fixed capital investment from around 13-15 
percent previously to 33 percent in 1977. Including state 
enterprises, the proportion increased to almost half of investment as 
compared to a third previously. Public sector investment favored 
public services, communications and housing. Conversely, the share 
of government investment to agriculture, energy and mining declined, 
as did the share of private sector investment. Moreover, state 
investment tended to favor import-substitution rather than export-
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promotion acti viti es. The profitability of these investments was 
assured by increased levels of tariffs on competing imports. 
The end result was a production structure that was largely 
uncompetitive in world markets. As a result, exports stagnated at 
about US$2 billion, while imports soared to about US$3.8 billion, 
fueled by bad weather, economic expansion, and increased military and 
petroleum import expenditures. And so the resource gap (trade 
balance) grew to an annual average of about US$1.5 billion, the 
current account deficit increased to about the same magnitude and 
foreign borrowing exploded to cover the shortfall (Figure 12). Total 
externa 1 debt increased from US$1. 0 bi 11 ion in 1976 to over US$11 
billion in 1983 (Figure 10). 
The sectoral allocation and the level of government expenditures 
resulted in a marked decline in domestic (public and private) 
savings. The financial requirements of the investment program was at 
least partially financed by money creation, and so inflation 
increased. Because the increased general level of prices operated 
against fixed consumer prices of many products, subsidy costs 
increased, further accentuating the budget shortfall. 
All of these factors led to a current account deficit that 
reached almost US$2 billion in 1977 and around $1.5 billion in each 
of the next three years (Figure 14). Foreign public and private debt 
increased from slightly over US$2 billion in 1976 to over $7 billion 
in 1980. 
The momentum of the government investment program was broken in 
1978 with a sharp reduction in that program. But the economy's 
investment rate has remained high (in excess of 20 percent of GDP) 
while the domestic savings ratio has remained low (slightly in excess 
of 10 percent of GDP). As a result, consumption expenditures have 
increased only at a rate about equal to the rate of population 
growth. 
The capability of the government to stimulate economic growth 
through external borrowing has been significantly reduced . The debt 
service requirement, US$2 billion in 1983, has become a significant 
drain on the economy. In August 1983 the nation was unab 1 e to meet 
these debt service payments. The subsequent negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Paris Club have led to 
rescheduled debt payments and increased external financial resources. 
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1982 
But as the data clearly indicate, debt service payments, which are 
scheduled to average about US$2 billion annually over the next three 
years, will continue to place an uncompromising constraint on economy 
growth. 
In response to the IMF agreement and the projected level of debt 
service requirements, the government has embarked -- at least 
rhetorically -- on export expansion. Expansion of exports of 
phosphate and its products is a central part of that plan, and 
investment in the mining sector remains high. In addition, the 
government has initiated several programs and policies to increase 
exports of industrial and agricultural products. Those policies and 
programs constitute the current economic policy environment. 
Economic Policies 
Exchange Rates and Foreign Exchange Policy 
All foreign exchange transactions are centralized in the Bank of 
Morocco; however, banks may offset purchases and sales of convertible 
currencies for private individuals. Each day these banks must 
balance their accounts with the Bank of Morocco; these transactions 
occur at exchange rates fixed daily by the Central Bank. A forward 
exchange market, effective since June 1979, is available for selected 
imports and exports. Because banks are not allowed to deal among 
themselves, no foreign exchange market exists in Morocco. 
The Bank of Morocco fixes buying and selling rates for the 
French franc on the basis of changes in a market basket of exchange 
rates weighted by each nation's importance in Moroccan merchandise 
trade. Cross rates for other converti b 1 e currencies are determined 
by the fixed dirham-French franc exchange rate and the cross rates of 
those currencies with the French franc in the Paris foreign exchange 
market. 
The exchange rate policy requires a fairly rigid control of 
capital flows. Exchange control, administered by the Exchange Office 
of the Ministry of Finance, is viewed as fairly complex but not 
cumbersome, because rules and guidelines are documented and observed. 
Accardi ng to the IMF Annua 1 Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
E~change Restrictions, 1983, nonresidents may hold (1) foreign 
33 
currency accounts, (2) foreign accounts in convertible dirhams, and 
( 3) capita 1 accounts. After approva 1 of the Exchange Office, the 
foreign currency accounts permit free transfer of funds. Transfers 
from the convertible dirham accounts, with some restrictions, may be 
freely effected . Capital account fund transfers require, with a few 
exceptions, i ndi vi dua 1 approva 1 from the Office of Exchange. This 
account can be used freely to meet tax obligations within Morocco. 
Expatriation of profits remains a discretionary tool of the 
government. The exception is in the area of tourism investment. In 
August 1983 a new tourism investment code was introduced, which 
assures unrestricted, 100 percent expatriation of after-tax tourism 
profits. 
Control of capital flows and the absence of a foreign exchange 
market (excepting, of course, any local black market) allow the 
Moroccan government to use the exchange rate as a too 1 of export 
promotion. A key restraining factor on the degree of manipulation of 
the exchange rate is the potential adverse effect on worker 
remittances. In recognition of the need to pro vi de incentives, in 
addition to the premium discussed earlier, an interest rate of 8 
percent has been paid on worker remittance accounts since 1983. 
Previously, no interest had been paid on those accounts. 
Many developing nations adopted exchange rate and economic 
policies in the 1970s that led to an overvaluation of their currency. 
In severa 1 cases, the boom in prices of exports of raw rna teri a 1 --
oil, or in the case of Morocco, phosphate -- financed necessary 
imports which previously had been financed by industrial and 
agricultural exports. Overvaluation of currencies held down the 
price of imports but reduced competitiveness of these countries in 
international markets. The value of the Moroccan currency followed 
this pattern. 
Several aggregate measures of the value of a currency are used 
to evaluate the relative value of the dirham. First, based on the 
weights of the currency basket, the nominal exchange rate index shows 
a moderate increase in the value of the dirham until 1980 (Figure 
15). However, due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar and the 
appreciation of the dirham, the real exchange rate index shows a 
dramatic increase in the value of the dirham from 1972 to 1974, a 
moderate depreciation from 1974 to 1976 and then continued 
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appreciation until 1980. The trade weighted index shows a similar 
pattern (Figure 16). 
Several estimates placed the overvaluation of the Moroccan 
currency at about 16 percent in 1980. By 1 ate 1983 the dirham had 
depreciated in real terms about 19 percent against the currency 
basket and about 12 percent against a trade-weighted measure. The 
gradual depreciation of the currency has been continued in 1984. The 
following table shows the changes in several bilateral nominal 
exchange rates (buying rates) in 1983: 
French franc 
U.S. dollar 
Pound sterling 
Deutschmark 
Spanish pesetas (100) 
Tunisian dinar 
March 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 30 
--------------(in dirhams)-------------
.90431 .89709 .98010 .96423 
6.5689 6.8440 7.8442 8.0436 
9.7267 10.4680 11 . 7120 11.6510 
2.7089 2.6922 2.9713 2.9454 
4.8213 4.7142 5.1577 5.1272 
9.9700 10.0260 11.0830 11.0150 
The movements broadly reflect the intent to maintain or increase the 
competitiveness of Moroccan products. 
Because Spain is Morocco's most important competitor for the 
Western European fruit and vegetable market, the movement of the 
dirham against the Spanish peseta is of special interest. Despite an 
appreciating nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate index 
shows only a slight increase in value of the dirham relative to the 
peseta during the mid 1970s and somewhat of a decline since that time 
(Figure 17). Spanish inflation rates exceeded those of Morocco, 
tending to offset the appreciation of the dirham. However, the 
Moroccan currency appreciated against that of its principal trading 
partner, France, throughout the 1970s (Figure 18). That relatively 
higher value was maintained through 1982. Since that time, the 
dirham has depreciated markedly against the franc. 
Finally, all exporters must repatriate and surrender foreign 
exchange earnings within 30 to 90 days, depending on the type of 
contract. Recent liberalization of the Investment Code may make this 
restriction less onerous. At this time 5 to 15 percent of foreign 
exchange may be retained for ongoing exporting expenses. 
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FIGURE 15. NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDICES, 
CURRENCY BASKET WEIGHTS, 
MOROCCO, 1970-83 (1975=1.00). 
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FIGURE 16. NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDICES, 
TRADE WEIGHTS, MOROCCO, 1970-83. (1975=1.00) 
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FIGURE 17. NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDICES, 
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Wage Policy 
A minimum rural and urban wage has been established by the 
government. However, due to the high 1 eve 1 s of unemp 1 oyment and 
underemployment, it is not routinely observed and does not "distort" 
resource allocation. 
Export Promotion Policies 
Since the debt crisis of 1982/83 the government of Morocco has 
adopted an aggressive export-promotion/import-substitution stance. 
The policies include (1) a flexible exchange rate, (2) trade and 
exchange liberalization, and (3) investment incentives. Tariffs, 
quotas and outright prohibition of some products have biased domestic 
prices in favor of import-substitution products. The increase in 
relative prices of these goods, in turn, increases the profitability 
of those industries and tends to induce an inflow of resources. 
As a practical matter, Morocco maintains three lists of imports, 
A-C. Any article on the "A List," including most complementary food 
imports, may be freely imported. Articles on the "B List" are 
subject to varying tariff rates with an average of about 16 percent. 
Articles on the "C List," which may not be imported, include autos 
and almost all fresh and processed fruits and vegetables. In 1982, 
in order to reduce the flow of imports in response to foreign 
exchange shortages, a number of products were transferred from the 
"A" to "B" list and from the "B" to "C" list. More recently, some of 
the products have been transferred back. 
The adverse impact of the trade restrictions on export 
industries is widely recognized in Morocco, but reduction in tariffs 
has been resisted by the government because the tariffs are a major 
source of its revenue. To allow the gradual reduction in tariffs, 
Morocco has sought special assistance from the World Bank. 
Reportedly, the agreement would initially replace all revenues lost 
from reduced tariffs and then the assistance would be gradually 
reduced. If this agreement is reached, the competitive position of 
Morocco's export industries would be enhanced. 
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In the area of foreign investment, the 1973 investment code has 
been modified to provide incentives for investment in the export 
sector. A ten-year tax holiday has been made available for 
investment in export production and marketing. Additional policies 
include a more flexible pol icy on short-term and intermediate-term 
export credits, a reduction of the number of products requiring an 
export license and the abolition of the state-export monopoly on 
processed food products. 
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JORDANIAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND POLICIES 
Economic Environment 
Economic development and growth of Jordan are products of the 
volatile politics of the region and of the price and volume of 
petroleum exports of the Arab countries, although Jordan itself is 
not a petroleum exporter. Petroleum exports affect Jordan in two 
ways. First, the amount of foreign aid provided by Arab oil 
exporters has been constrained by the recent fa 11 in oi 1 revenues. 
Second, the continuation of the flow of worker remittances is 
dependent on the continuation of high levels of investment in the oil 
exporting countries. That investment has fallen as oil revenues have 
declined. 
The volatility of economic growth is reflected in the wide 
variation in economic growth rates. Prior to 1975, growth was 
erratic, with real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GOP) expanding 
to 194 Jordanian dinars (JD) in 1972 but subsequently declining to 
about JD171 in 1975 (Figure 19). Commencing in the following year, 
the economy expanded rapidly throughout the remainder of the 1970s. 
GOP in nominal terms increased by 175 percent from 1975 to 1979 and 
real per capita GOP increased by 75 percent. Rapid growth continued 
unti 1 1982 with real per capita GOP increasing by an additional 8 
percent. The economic growth has slowed significantly in the past 
two years, with an increase in real per capita GDP in 1983 of only 
2. 7 percent. 
The pattern of economit growth primarily reflects the growth of 
government capital expenditures which, in turn, were financed by 
foreign aid and borrowing (Figures 20 and 21). From 1976 to 1977, a 
doubling of capital expenditures was financed by a doubling of 
foreign aid. The decline in foreign aid in 1978 was offset by 
increased foreign borrowing. Foreign aid almost tripled from 1978 to 
1979, supporting the significant growth in recurring and capital 
expenditures. The increased aid reflects the $1.2 billion pledged to 
Jordan, as one of the front-line states against Israel, by the 
oil-exporting Arab nations at the 1978 Bagdad Conference. The level 
of foreign aid continued through 1981, but with the drop in petroleum 
revenues and the Iran-Iraq war, external budget support fell by JD22 
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million in 1982 and a further JD54.5 million in 1983. The shortfall 
in foreign aid was offset by increased international borrowing 
(Figure 21). 
The dramatic growth of the economy was accompanied by a rapid 
increase in merchandise imports, which increased fourfold from 1974 
to 1979 and almost doubled again between 1979 and 1983 (Figure 23). 
Merchandise exports grew rather slowly during the late 1970s but 
expanded rapidly from 1979 through 1982. That pattern reflects the 
investment in phosphate m1n1ng and export facilities and the 
increased import needs of Iraq due to the Iran-Iraq war. The volume 
of merchandise exports, however, fell far short of covering 
merchandise imports. As a result, the resource gap (trade deficit) 
grew from about US$.5 billion in 1975 to US$1.3 billion in 1979. It 
has averaged s 1 i ghtly over US$2 .1 billion in the most recent three 
years. 
The resource gap has been financed by foreign aid (official 
unrequited transfers) and the remittances of Jordanians working in 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Private unrequited transfers, 
the bu 1 k of which are worker remittances, increased from US$172 
million in 1975 to about US$.5 billion in 1979 and to US$1 billion in 
the most recent years (Figure 24). 
The high levels of worker remittances and foreign aid have 
1 imi ted to some extent Jordan's need for foreign borrowing. 
Neverthe 1 ess, pub 1 i c debt increased more than tenfo 1 d from 1970 to 
1983 with much of the increase in recent years to offset foreign aid 
reductions. In 1983, debt service of the public and private sector 
was estimated at about US$336 million, about one-third of merchandise 
exports (Figure 22). 
Severa 1 factors condition the current economic environment in 
Jordan. First, the decline in oil revenues may 1 ead to a further 
reduction in budget support from the Arab oil exporters and a 
stagnation or decline in worker remittances. Second, the recent 
growth in merchandise exports was primarily in low-value-added 
products (phosphate and potash), and a very 1 arge proportion of 
exports (roughly half) went to neighboring Arab states. Third, with 
the continuing difficulties in Lebanon, Jordan sees itself as a 
future center of finance and business activities in the region. A 
stable, convertible currency is central to Jordan's attractiveness to 
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outside capital and business investment. In sui11T\ary, there is a 
growing recognition of the need to increase merchandise exports, 
particularly of high-value-added products and to diverse trade 
destinations. 
Economic Policies 
Exchange Rate and Foreign Exchange Policies 
Foreign exchange controls are very liberal in Jordan: 
1. Residents and non-residents may bring in or take out 
unlimited amounts of foreign bank notes and coins. 
2. Non-residents may keep unlimited foreign exchange accounts. 
The limit for residents is JD10000. 
3. Arab nationals can freely purchase or sell shares and bonds 
issued by Jordanian shareholding companies . 
4. Foreign exchange from exports to Arab countries need not be 
repatriated. 
5. Sums up to JD5000 may be transferred abroad without 
documentation by residents. 
6. Licensed banks are permitted to lend in foreign currencies 
to residents and non-residents. 
The relative freedom of capital movements places direct restrictions 
on the freedom of the Central Bank to manipulate the exchange rate. 
A stable, predictable exchange rate has been a goal of the 
Jordanian government for a number of years. The Jordan dinar was 
linked to the pound sterling until 1971, at which time it was pegged 
to the U.S. dollar. When the dollar devalued relative to the pound 
(a defacto devaluation of the dinar), the gold content of the dinar 
was reduced to maintain the exchange rate at $2.80. When the U.S. 
dollar devalued further in February of 1973, the gold content of the 
dinar remained unchanged and thus it appreciated to $3.11. On July 
1, 1974, the dinar was placed on a controlled, floating basis, and in 
February of the following year it was linked to the SDR (Special 
Drawing Rights) at a value of SDR 2.57895/JD. That linkage has been 
maintained since that date. 
The SDR relationship is based on a market basket of six 
currencies (the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, 
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Italy and Japan). A change in the value of one of these currencies 
with respect to the SDR automatically changes its value with respect 
to the dinar and all cross rates. But because each currency 
represents only a portion of the SDR, the change wi 11 be 1 ess than 
its appreciation or depreciation with respect to other currencies. 
For example, the US$ appreciated against all major currencies and the 
SDR from 1981 to 1982. In response, the value of the dinar was 
automatically adjusted as follows: 
1981 1982 % Change 
u.s. dollar .3305 .3525 6.7 
Pound sterling .6684 .6164 -7.8 
Deutschmark .1466 .1453 -0.9 
French franc .0611 .0539 -11.8 
Italian lira (per 100) .0292 .0261 -10.6 
Japanese yen (per 100) .1476 .1414 -4.2 
(all measures in JD per foreign currency unit). 
During this period the JD depreciated by 6.7 percent with 
respect to the US do 11 a r but appreciated with respect to a 11 other 
currencies, with the appreciation ranging up to almost 12 percent 
against the French franc. Undoubtedly, the strength of the dinar 
against the major European currencies provided incentives for worker 
remittances. At the same time it discouraged exports because the 
appreciation increased Jordanian prices in foreign markets. Imports 
from those countries, of course, declined. 
The exchange rate policy adopted by Jordan requires that its 
inflation rate not differ greatly from that of the major-currency 
countries. Because inflation has been somewhat higher in Jordan than 
in other countries, the dinar may have become somewhat overvalued. 
This policy also requires significant external financing to balance 
the current account and the fiscal budget. Under the current foreign 
exchange policies, the exchange rate will not be used as an 
instrument of commercial policy. 
Price Policies 
The prices of most consumer goods are administered by the 
Ministry of Supply (Table 6). Reportedly, the control of retail 
prices has two origins. First, price controls were adopted during 
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TABLE 6 Products Sold Under Administered Prices, Jordan, 1984 
1. Juices 17. Macaroni 
2. Beverages 18. Detergents 
3. Mineral Waters 19. Dairy Products 
4. Sugar 20. Fresh and Frozen Meats 
5. Rice 21. Tomato Paste* 
6. Bread 22. Salt 
7. Flour 23. Paper Tissue 
8. Hallawa and Tahynek 
24. Fuels 
9. Coffee 25. School Uniforms 
10. Cakes and Sweets* 26. Cigarettes 
11. Poultry 27. Cement 
12. Cooking Oils 28. Toothpaste 
13. Cooking Fats* 29. Shaving Paste 
14. Corn 30. Restaurant Prices 
15. Bran 31. Vehicle Spare Parts 
16. Lentils 32. Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
Source: Ministry of Supply, January 1983. 
*Locally produced. 
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the 1967 war to control inflation. Second, influential editorialists 
called for "declared" prices as observed in developed nations . The 
push for "declared" prices evolved into the "administered" price 
system. 
As is the case in many other countries, the prices of wheat, 
wheat flour and bread are heavily subsidized. However, budget 
realities have forced periodic adjustments even in bread prices. In 
1982, the level of subsidies, grants and awards was JD19.4 billion, 
only 4 percent of recurring expenditures and 2.6 percent of total 
government expenditures. A second subsidy category, that for fue 1 
prices, amounted to JD58 million. Total subsidies, therefore, appear 
to be about JD77 million or about 17 percent of recurring 
expenditures and 11 percent of total expenditures. 
For certain commodities (rice and sugar, for example), the 
administered price system generates government revenues because the 
fixed prices exceed import prices. The downward trend of world 
commodity prices since 1980 coupled with the appreciation of the 
dinar against the major currencies have reduced import prices. This 
is another reason for the governmental support of a strong dinar. 
The price contra 1 s are readily evident in the Amman who 1 esa 1 e 
price index (Table 7). The large jump in the WPI from 1980 to 1981 
reflects the large increase (reduced subsidy) in the price of fuel. 
The wholesale and retail margins of fruits and vegetables are 
controlled but not the farm price. As a result, the prices of fruits 
and vegetables have increased much faster than those of other 
products. Undoubtedly, the subsidization of other food and consumer 
prices has contributed to the increased demand and hence increased 
prices of fruits and vegetables. 
Trade Policy 
Differentiated customs tariffs and quantitative restrictions are 
used to control the flow of imported foodstuffs. The basic 
phi 1 osophy is to keep tariffs 1 ow and imports unrestricted. If the 
product does not compete with domestic production, on the other hand, 
imports that could potentially compete with domestic production are 
effectively barred from the market by very high tariff rates. 
Seasonal quantitative restrictions are used to control the flow of 
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TABLE 7 Amman Wholesale Price Index (1975=100), 1978-82 
Group 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Seeds and Pulses 132.8 141.3 151.8 145.1 150 . 7 
Vegetables 226.4 241.4 253.4 257.5 266.0 
Fruits 213.6 215.3 214.9 223.3 209.8 
Meat and Fish 124.1 127 .8 144.6 170.8 173.2 
Grocery Items 101.7 103.2 114.3 131.5 138.9 
All Items 128 .5 136.9 156.2 182.0 190.5 
Excluding Fuel 129.0 135.2 146.2 162.9 167.1 
CPI - Food 135.7 143.6 159.2 171.3 177.2 
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products that complement domestic production. Representative tariffs 
for selected foodstuffs are given in Table 8. 
In addition to the custom tariff, a "surcharge" of 17.2 percent 
is applied against any article subjected to an import tariff. (Fresh 
vegetables are not subject to import duties but are subject to 4 
percent surcharge.) Finally, any article free of customs tariffs is 
subject to a "tax" of 6.2 percent, composed of an additional tax, an 
"overtime allowance" and an import duty. (Products imported from the 
West Bank are not subject to duties or fees.) The limiting nature of 
a tariff and surcharge is readily evident for products like tomato 
paste with a total import duty of 70 percent. 
Together, the custom tariffs and the surcharge of 17.2 percent 
on fresh fruits and vegetables that compete with domestic production 
range from 31 to 50 percent, with most at the upper end of the range 
(Table 9). Other vegetables and fruits are subject only to the 6.2 
percent charge. However, quantity restrictions, via import licenses, 
control the import flow of these products. 
The Agricultural Economics Department of the Ministry of 
Agriculture prepares a "monthly plan" that serves as the basis for 
issuing import and export licenses. Each month the anticipated 
demand is compared with anticipated supply and import licenses issued 
for the anticipated shortfall. The intent is, of course, to control 
market price by controlling the flow to the market. The system 
occasionally has the opposite effect, as exports may be banned by the 
government if supplies are short. Critics allege that the system 
stymies medium- and long-term planning by producers, exporters and 
importers because of irregularities in the timing and the magnitude 
of restrictions on imports and exports. 
Export Promotion 
The export promotion policy lies almost exclusively in the 
promotion of domestic and foreign investment. Key features of the 
investment law include 
1. Extension of all privileges given to domestic capital to foreign 
capital. 
2. Guaranteed transfer of profits and interest earnings abroad 
in foreign currencies. 
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TABLE 8 Import Duties on Selected Foodstuffs, Jordan, 1984 
Product 
Poultry meat 
Most dairy products 
Eggs 
Fruit processed without sugar 
Fruit juice 
Dried fruits 
Tomato paste 
Coffee 
Unroasted 
Roasted and ground 
Cereals and lentils 
Soybeans 
Most animal and vegetable fats and oils 
Sugar 
Unrefined 
Refined 
Beef 
Pork 
Duty 
10 
0 
50 fil s/100 eggs 
23 
38 
23 
53 
50 fils/kg. 
23 
0 
14 
20 
0 
3-28 
0 
14 
Source: Jordan Customs and Excise Law and Tariff Rates. Ministr) 
of Finance and Customs. This list prepared by mission 
staff in 1982. 
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TABLE 9 Custom Tariffs on Fruits and Vegetables, Jordan, 1984 
Product 
Tomatoes 
Fresh beans, haricuts, broad beans 
Cucumbers, marrows, pumpkin 
Most other vegetables 
Dates, bananas, cocoanuts, guavas 
Pineapples, mangoes 
Citrus, fresh or dried 
Grapes 
Mushrooms, truffles 
Olives 
Onions, garlic and potatoes 
Dry leguminous vegetables 
Figs, fresh or dried 
Raisins 
Duty 
(percent) 
23 
23 
23 
23 
18 
35 
14 
13 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: Jordan Customs and Excise Law and Tariff Rates, Ministry of 
Finance and Customs, July 1984. 
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3. Free grants of public land. 
4. Exemption of profits from income tax for periods up to 9 
years and from property tax for periods up to 7 years. 
5. Exemption from customs and import duties of capital goods 
necessary for projects. 
An estimated 128 companies have recently established regional offices 
in Jordan in response to the favorable tax policies. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1 Selected National Account and Price Data, Egypt, 1970-1983/84 
Gross Net Foreign Gross Implicit 
Domestic Factor National GOP Per Capita 
Year Product Income Product Real GOP Deflator Population 
----------------(billion E£)---------------- (1975=1) (mi 11 ion) 
1970 2.971 -.044 2.927 3.784 .758 33.30 
1971 3.146 -.059 3.086 3.968 .793 34.08 
1972 3.417 -.014 3.403 4.121 .829 34.84 
1973 3.663 -.029 3.634 4.089 .896 35.62 
1974 4.197 -.112 4.085 4.191 .978 36.42 
1975 4.886 -.148 4.738 4.886 1.000 37.23 
1976 6.276 .133 6.409 5.266 1.192 37.87 
1977 8.210 .433 8.643 5.663 1.457 38.79 
1978 9.788 .983 10.771 6.226 1.572 39.82 
1979 12.610 .785 13.395 6. 776 1.861 40.98 
1980/81.!/ 16.804 NA NA 7.478 2.247 42.29 
1981/82.!./ 20.727 NA NA 8.4632/ 2.449 43.47 
1982/83 NA NA NA 9.0552/ NA 44.67 
1983/84 NA NA NA 9.707- NA 45.91 
Sources: International Financial Statistics; unpublished data, Ministry of Planning. 
1/ Preliminary. 
2/ Based on reported growth of real GOP of 7.0% in 1982/83 and 7.2% in 1983/84. ~/ Based on estimates from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. 
Real GOP 
(E£) 
113.5 
116.4 
118.3 
114.8 
118.0 
131.3 
139.0 
145.7 
156.3 
165.1 
176.8 
194.7 
202.7 
211.4 
Wholesale 
Price Index 
(1975=100) 
75.0 
75.1 
76.1 
81.3 
93.0 
100 .0 
107.8 
117.8 
135.2 
148.4 
3/ 170.53/ 
182.43; 
197.33/ 
240.3-
Note: Macroeconomic data for recent years are difficult to obtain ; therefore, these data should be 
considered provisional. 
TABLE A.2 Summary of Fiscal Operations, Egypt, 1974-1983/84 
Revenues ExEenditures 
Year Taxesll Pub 1 i c Sec torY Total Subsidies Other Total Budget Deficit 
------------------------------------------(billion E£)---------------------------------------
1974 .736 .338 1.184 .410 1.663 2.073 
1975 1.022 .364 1.524 .622 2.393 3.015 
1976 1.322 .573 2.015 .434 2.846 3.280 
1977 1.967 .652 2.755 .650 3.519 4.169 
1978 2.147 1.012 3.306 .710 4.849 5.559 
1979 2.412 .875 3.683 1.352 5.239 6.591 
1980/813/ 3.997 3.278 7.275 2.166 7.817 9.983 
1981/823/ 4.442 3.891 8.333 2.192 10.080 12.272 
1982/833/ 5.249 3.810 9.059 2.054 11.234 13.288 
1983/8~ 6.241 3.996 10.237 2.409 13.406 15.815 
Source: Unpublished World Bank data, Ministry of Finance data, and other estimates. 
1/ Direct and indirect taxes. 
2/ Transferred profits, investment self-financing, petroleum and Suez Canal receipts. 
~/ Preliminary and estimates. 
.889 
1.491 
1.264 
1.413 
2.252 
2.907 
2.708 
3.939 
4.230 
5.578 
TABLE A.3 Selected External Debt and Debt Service, Egypt, 1973-1983 
Debt!! Debt Service-!./ 
Year Public Private Total Interest Pri nci pa 1 Total 
-----------{billion US$)---------- --------------------{billion US$)-------------------
1973 1656.1 767.5 2423.6 531.3 70.4 601.7 
1974 2023.8 1025.1 3048.9 466.9 86.6 553.5 
1975 3910.9 1179.3 5090.2 510.2 133 .4 643.6 
1976 4735.9 1177.0 5912.0 569.7 119.8 689.5 
1977 6790.6 1470.5 8261.1 789.5 350.5 1140.0 
1978 8516.2 1927.4 10443.6 881.3 423.6 1304.9 
1979 9556.6 2680.2 12236.8 901.9 311.3 1213.2 
1980 10690.1 3147.5 13837.6 1236.6 406.4 1643.0 
1981 11460.7 3777.6 15238.3 1498.7 624.1 2122.8 
1982 12001.9 4623.3 16625.2 1915.3 712 .4 2627.7 
1983 13500.0 4420.0 17920.0 1755.0 753.4 2508.4 
Source: Economic Research Service, unpublished data. 
ll Includes medium- and long-term debt, disbursed and outstanding. 
TABLE A.4 Selected Balance of Payments Summary Data, Egypt, 1970-1983/84 
Other Private 
Merchandise Trade Goods & Unrequited Current 
Year Exports.!/ Importsl/ Resource Gap Services Net Transfers Account Balance 
----------------------------------- - --------(billion US$)-------- ----------------------------
1970 .817 1.084 .267 -.218 .033 -.148 
1971 .815 1.131 .281 .232 .038 .207 
1972 .813 1.170 .357 -.217 .110 -.174 
1973 1.000 1.429 .429 -.253 .123 .074 
1974 1.672 2.914 1.242 -.388 .310 -.326 
1975 1.567 3.941 2.374 -.465 .455 -1.398 
1976 1.609 3.842 2.233 -.039 .842 - .806 
1977 1.924 4.038 2.064 -.124 .988 -1.200 
1978 1.939 4.743 2.804 -.241 1.824 -1.220 
1979 2.857 6.002 3.578 -.233 2.269 -1.542 
1980 4.088 6.814 2.960 -.269 2.7913/ -.4384/ 
1980/81y 3.985 7.682 3.697 NA 2.6263/ -1.61-+it 
1981/82y 4.144 7. 721 3.577 NA 1.8283/ -2.36~/ 1982/83~/ 3.555 7.359 3.804 NA 2. 7673/ -1.3124/ 1983/8~ 3.900 7.697 3.797 NA 3.539- -.871-
Source: International Financial Statistics; unpublished data, Central Bank of Egypt, and other estimates. 
1/ F.O.B., C.I.F. imports converted to F.O.B . by multiplying by .8477. 
2/ Preliminary. 
3! Worker's remittances plus net investment income. !I Central Bank of Egypt and other estimates. 
Note: Macroeconomic data for recent years are difficult to obtain; therefore, these data should be 
considered provisional. 
TABLE A.5 Selected National Account Data, Morocco, 1970-1983 
Gross Gross 
Domestic Net Foreign National 
Real GOP.!/ Year Product Factor Income Expenditure 
-----------------------(billion dirhams)------------------------
1970 19.43 .04 
1971 21.38 .18 
1972 22.68 .24 
1973 24.92 .63 
1974 33.60 1.08 
1975 36.42 1.45 
1976 41.01 1.74 
1977 49.76 1.39 
1978 55.15 1.38 
1979 61.04 1.41 
1980 70.16 1.42 
1981 76.74 .45 
19822/ 88.52 1.25 
1983=- 94.83 1.25 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
1/ 1975 prices. £1 Preliminary. 
19.47 27.28 
21.56 28.87 
22.92 29.47 
25.55 30.60 
34.68 34.98 
38.87 36.42 
42.75 39.98 
51.15 41.50 
56.53 42.90 
63.45 44.85 
71.58 46.66 
77.19 45.64 
89.77 48.43 
96.08 48.72 
Per Capita Population 
(dirhams) (million) 
1781 15.31 
1877 15.38 
1877 15.70 
1876 16.31 
2082 16.80 
2104 17.31 
2242 17.83 
2260 18.36 
2269 18.91 
2304 19.47 
2327 20.05 
2211 20.65 
2264 21.39 
2199 22.16 
TABLE A.6 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Source: 
Selected Trade and Capital Flow Data, Morocco, 1970- 1983 
Merchandise 
Exports Imports Resource Gap 
Other 
Goods & 
Services Net 
Private 
Unrequited 
Transfer Net 
Current 
Account Balance 
--- --------------- ---------------------(billion U.S. dollars)-- - - - - --------- - - - - ------ - - ---------
.487 .624 -.137 .060 .036 - .161 
.499 .673 -.137 .031 .074 -.094 
.642 .709 -.067 .023 .107 -. 017 
.913 1.037 -.124 .024 . 211 .063 
1.074 1.692 .012 .115 . 299 .172 
1.529 2.266 - .736 .308 .482 - .562 
1.247 2.308 -1.061 .842 .499 - 1.353 
1. 283 2.821 -1.538 .878 . 546 - 1.826 
1.488 2.629 -1.140 . 957 .702 - 1.348 
1.937 3.245 -1.390 1.146 .891 -1. 530 
2.414 3.770 -1.355 1.181 1.004 - 1.420 
2.283 3.840 -1.557 1.373 .998 - 1.861 
2.043 3.815 -1.772 1.800 .977 - 1.899 
2.031 3.218 -1.182 .931 .844 - 1.169 
International Financial Sta t istics, 1967- 1981; unpublished World Bank Data , 1982; U.S . Embassy, 
1983 . 
TABLE A.7 Selected Foreign Debt and Debt Service Data, Morocco, 1973-1983 
Debt .If Debt Service 
Year Official Private Total Principal Interest Total 
1973 816.5 221.3 1037.8 90.7 44.5 135.2 
1974 919.6 348.8 1268.4 99.5 46.5 146.0 
1975 1120.9 696.6 1817.5 103.5 54.6 158.1 
1976 1250.0 1303.4 2553.4 121.5 78.7 200.2 
1977 1975.7 2282.7 4258.4 140.2 158.7 298.9 
1978 2456.3 3132.8 5589.1 346.7 284.4 631.1 
1979 2833.4 3866.6 7175.0 445.2 455.2 900.4 
1980 3466.0 4081.7 8083.7 625.3 662.7 1288.0 
1981 4351.0 4032.5 9424.5 675.4 700.8 1376.2 
1982 4898.8 4744.6 10505.4 847.5 696.1 1543.6 
1983 5400.0 4800.0 11002.0 1231.4 822.9 2054.3 
Source: Economic Research Service, unpublished data. 
ll Long- and medium-term debt, disbursed and outstanding. 
TABLE A.8 Summary of Fiscal Operations, Morocco, 1970-83 
Current Ex~enditures Borrowing 
Year Revenue Current Capital Deficit Grants External Domestic 
1970 3.221 2.902 1.145 0.826 0.108 0.268 0.450 
1971 3.267 3.106 1.123 0.962 0.461 0.321 0.180 
1972 3.362 3.350 1.189 1.177 0.562 0.320 0.295 
1973 4.142 3.624 1.208 0.690 0.401 0.007 0.282 
1974 7.093 6.470 2.236 1.613 0.487 0.179 0.947 
1975 8.490 7.345 4.454 3.309 1.353 1.350 0.606 
1976 8.322 7.799 8.121 7. 790 1.827 4.474 1.489 
1977 10.784 9.245 10.306 8.767 2.796 5.194 0.777 
1978 11.693 10.420 6.629 5.356 0.469 3.365 1.522 
1979 13.802 12.073 9.016 6.269 1.640 2.376 2.253 
1980 15.193 15.310 8.565 7.510 0.380 3.531 3.599 
1981 17.838 18.898 9.612 11.098 1.623 7.937 1.538 
1982 20.480 20.475 12.481 11.108 0.285 9.356 1.467 
1983 21.525 21.525 7.979 8.003 1.010 4.231 2.762 
Sources: 1979-1982: Unpublished World Bank data. 
1983: U.S. Embassy, Rabat. 
TABLE A.9 Government Finance, Jordan, 1970-1983 
Revenues Expenditures 
Foreign Forei gn 
OtherY Year Domestic Grants Borrowing Total Recurring Capital Total Balance 
----- ---------------------------------------(million JD) ------- - - ------------------------- --------
1970 30.260 35 . 424 2.072 .415 67.171 59.028 21.678 80.706 -13.535 
1971 35.755 35.387 3.556 3.430 78.198 60.735 22.412 83.147 -4.949 
1972 42.559 44.455 7.400 1.238 95.652 70.467 30.985 101.452 -5 .800 
1973 46.182 43 .608 11.446 2.000 103 . 236 78.608 40.903 119 . 511 -13.725 
1974 63.225 52.976 8.911 -- 125.112 104.839 46 . 665 151.504 -26.392 
1975 84 . 209 90.013 18.987 16.500 209.709 136.255 73 . 178 209 .433 0. 276 
1976 107.587 66.238 19.888 -- 193.713 185.894 76 . 590 262.484 -68.771 
1977 142.249 122.202 58.511 
--
322.962 195.587 142.252 337.839 -14.877 
1978 158.488 81.699 90.797 -- 330.884 212.891 148. 619 361.510 -30.626 
1979 187.859 210.302 37.624 
--
435 .821 321.335 194 .329 515 .664 -79.843 
1980 226.148 202.834 71.566 6469 507.017 336.053 227 .091 563 . 144 -56 . 127 
19811/ 309.199 206.312 75.731 7226 598 .468 391.468 255 . 632 647 . 100 -48.632 
19821/ 360.221 184.500 61.491 400 606 .612 443.770 222.506 656.276 -45 . 664 
1983- 396.000 130 .000 101.547 2000 629 . 547 448 .981 268. 673 717 . 654 -88. 107 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthll Statistical Bulletin . 
1/ Preliminary. 
'l_! Expected Loans and Technical Assistance , Loans Repaid to Central government. 
TABLE A.10 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators , Jo rdan , 1970- 1983 
Gross Net Foreign Gross 
Domestic Factor National GDP Real GDP 
Year Product Income Product Deflator Rea l GDP Per Cap. Population Exchange Rate 
- ------- - --(million JD)-------- - - - (1980-100) (mil. JD) (JD) (mi 11 ion) (US$/JD) 
1970 174.4 12.6 187.0 42.73 408.14 178 . 23 2. 29 2.8000 
1971 186.2 13.2 199.4 44.14 421.84 179.51 2.35 2.8000 
1972 207 . 2 13.8 221.0 44.39 466.77 193.68 2.41 2.8000 
1973 218.3 23.2 241.5 47.90 455.74 184 . 51 2.47 3.0549 
1974 247.3 32.0 279.3 55.03 449.39 177.62 2.53 3.1198 
1975 278 .6 63.9 342.5 62.77 443. 84 171.37 2.59 3.1305 
1976 401.7 140.8 542 . 5 68.36 587.62 221.74 2.65 3.0115 
1977 525.2 145.9 671.1 72.47 724.7 267.4 2. 71 3.0373 
1978 644.6 148.8 793.4 75.41 816 .9 308.6 2. 77 3.2620 
1979 767.2 168.3 935.5 83.67 852.4 322.9 2.84 3.3270 
1980 998.4 205.8 1204.2 100.0 998.4 341.9 2.92 3.3478 
1981 1182.5 318.5 1501.0 113.1 1097.9 346.2 3.02 3.0654 
1982 1343.2 332 .2 1675.4 119 .8 1160.9 358.2 3.13 2.8369 
1983 1487.4 361.0 1848.4 120.7 1232.3 381.5 3.23 2.7617 
Source: International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statist i cal Bulletin. 
TABLE A.ll 
Year 
Selected Balance of Payments Summary Data, Jordan, 1970-1983 
Merchandise 
Exports Imports 
Resource 
GAP 
Unrequited 
Transfers 
Private Official 
Other 
Goods & 
Services Net 
Current 
Account Balance 
--------------------------------------(mi111on u.s. dollars)-------------------------------------
1970 34.1 163.8 -129 -- 110.8 -0.7 -19.6 
1971 32.0 190.4 -158 -- 100.3 -3.7 -61.8 
1972 47.6 236.6 -189 27.2 184.5 -16.2 6.5 
1973 73.9 292.7 -219 55.6 186.5 -10.7 12.6 
1974 155.0 432 .4 -277 82 .4 252 . 1 -53.7 3.4 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
153.0 
206.9 
248.9 
296.6 
401.9 
573.6 
742 .9 
751.3 
580.0 
648.6 
907.7 
1225.2 
1334.6 
1741.8 
2130.1 
2850.6 
2877.7 
2694.8 
-495 172.1 
-700 401.7 
-967 420.8 
-1038 466.2 
-1340 508.6 
-1556 664 .8 
-2108 935.2 
-2126 932.4 
-2115 
409.5 -41.3 44.7 
353.2 -18.1 36.0 
500 .3 38.8 -16.5 
335.3 -51.6 -288 .2 
1055.6 -231.0 -6.8 
1308.7 -44.0 373.8 
1279.5 -141.8 -34.8 
1033.4 -172.1 -332 .7 
Source : International Financial Statistics, Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. 
TABLE A.12 Selected External Debt and Debt Service, Jordan, 1973-1983 
Debtll Debt Service 
Year otticra.T ___ Private Total Pri ncipal Interest Total 
1973 192.1 16.4 208.5 8.4 3.0 11.4 
1974 238.8 30.6 269.4 10.5 3.8 14.3 
1975 291.3 53.7 345.0 15.0 7.2 22.2 
1976 361.5 94.7 456.2 24.5 10 .8 35 .3 
1977 469.1 277.6 746.7 39.0 22.0 61.0 
1978 608.9 500.2 1109.1 63.2 43 . 2 106.4 
1979 765 .0 520.2 1285.2 82.8 60.1 142.9 
1980 993.9 749.1 1743.0 128.9 104.1 233.0 
1981 1226.2 780.9 2007.1 192.1 124.0 316.1 
1982 1464.8 741.0 2205.8 189.7 130.1 319.8 
1983 1620.0 750.0 2370.0 184.0 152.4 336.4 
Source: Economic Research Service, unpublished data. 
y Includes med i um- and long-term debt, disbursed and outstanding. 
